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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WEIDNIG BROTHERS, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
M. NEPHI MANNING, 
Defendant a;nd Respondent. I 
Case No. 7992 
MOTION TO DISMISS PEiTITION FOR 
REHEARING AND OPPOSING BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
FILED 
-JAN 2 0 1954IUGGINS & HUGGINS 
_______ A.t~{).OJ;eys for Defendant and 
---ci;k",-s~;~;;court, lB~ondent . 
.I.O.WOODY PRINTING CO.,OGDEN, UtAH 
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IN THE SUPREME COUR,T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WEENIG BROTHERS, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
M. NEPHI MANNING, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO SAID PETITION 
Comes now the respondent, M. Nephi Manning and 
moves this Honorable Court to dismiss appellant's peti-
for rehearing upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THAT SAID PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS 
NOT FILEiD OR SERVED WITHIN THE TIME RE-
QUIRED BY LAW, WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT 
PRAYS THAT SAID PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BE DISMISSED. 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THAT THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS 
NOT. SERVED OR FILED WITHIN THE TIME RE-
QUIRED BY STATUTE. 
The decision in this case was filed in the Supreme 
Court November 2, 1953. Rule 76 U. R. C. P. Subdivision 
(e) (1) provides: 
"within 20 days after the filing of the decision 
of the Supreme Court, either party 1nay petition 
the court for a rehearing"* "and shall be served 
upon the adverse party prior to filing" 
Rule 76 U. R. C. P. Subdivision (e) ( 4) provides that: 
*"for good cause shown the Supreme Court or any 
Justice tlrereof may extend the time for filing 
any papers or matter required to be filed in the 
Supreme Court by these rules; provided that 
only one ex parte extension for not to exc'eed two 
weeks shall be granted; if additional time is re-
quired it shall be granted only upon written 
stipulation or upon two days notice to the adverse 
party*" 
Petition for rehearing and brief were served upon 
respondent, through his attorney, December 31, 1953, 
by mail, but was not received until January 2, 1954, t\ro 
months after filing the decision of the court. In the 
interim no stipulation was entered into between the 
parties or their counsel for a greater enlarge1nent of 
time, .and no motion or notice of motion for a grt>atPr 
enlargement of time was served upon or called to the 
attention of the respondent, so that the tilne betwePn 
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filing of this court's decision and serving of the petition 
for rehearing upon respond:ent exceeded the 20 days 
plus t'vo weeks ex parte extension by at least 25 days 
and, hence, said petition should be dismissed. 
Dated this 18th day of 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THIS COURT DID NOT l\1ISCONSTRUE THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE BY AFFIRMING THAT 
PORTION OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE 
OPERATION OF HIS AUTOJ\10BILE' AT THE TIME 
OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT SO FIND. 
All of the facts in this case, as well as the law per-
tinent thereto, were before this court and wer'e fully 
briefed and fully argued upon appeal. The trial court 
found that the damage to plaintiff's car was not caused 
by any negligence of the defendant but from plaintiff's 
own negligence, another way of stating proximate cause, 
(Finding No. 8). 
There is nothing new or novel in the petition for 
rehearing or the arguments of couns'el not fully covered 
and gone into in arguments and considered by this court. 
3 
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There is competent, (even though so1ne contradictory), 
evidence in this record upon which the trial court, as 
tri!er of the facts, as well as judge of the law, 1nade each 
and every finding in its Finding of Fact. This court 
will not disturb a finding of the lower court if based 
upon substantial evidence and not being unreasonable. 
This court fully considered Section 41-6-57 UCA 53 upon 
which appellant relies for a rehearing. The s'ection "Tas 
fully briefed and argued as will appear fron1 pages 15 
and' 16 of its original brief and was discussed by this 
court at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page ~ of 
the green sheet. The evidence was conflicting, plaintiff 
contending that defendant was passing the truck and the 
defendant claiming that he was engaged in an explora-
tory maneuver to determine wheth!er it was safe to pass. 
The physical facts support the defendant because he 
immediately turned back into his lane of traffic and the 
impact occurred less than thr'ee feet east of the center 
of the highway, involving the left side of defendant\; 
car. Had he been abreast of the truck, he could not 
have turned back onto the west side of the highway. 
Thle North vs. Cartwright case, 229 P 2d, cited 
by petitioner, adds nothing new to the cases already 
cited by appellant and considered by the court. In fact, 
it is very much in line with the cas1es cited in the original 
brief, all of them-cases where the party in the position 
of the defendant in this case brought an action to re-
cover damages, and _those cases resulting favorably to 
applellant's contension simply found that the n1oving 
party, the party seeking to recover da1nages, was guilty 
of contributory negligence, and, the law in this state 
with respect to contributory negligence, is so "·pll estab-
lished that there is no need to cite eases to this court.. 
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Even if it were found that the respondent was guilty 
of negligence, certainly the finding of the trial court that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, under 
the circumstances, would bar a recovery. 
The Skirl vs. Willow Creek Coal Company 92 Ut 
47 4, 69 P 2d 502, is not in conflict with the decision in 
the instant case. It can as well be argued and with as 
much propriety that the statute and the' law fixing speed 
linlits and making it unlawful to op~rate ~ vehicle in 
excess of those~ lin1its fixes a standard of duty or care 
for the safety of life, limb or property as certainly as 
the section upon which appellant relies. , 
POINT II 
THIS COURT DID NOT FAIL TO PROPERLY 
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUIL,TY OF 
NEGLIGENCE AS A l\1ATTER OF LAW IN THE 
OPERATION OF HIS AUTOJ\IOBILE ON THE 
WRONG OR IMPROPER SIDE, OF THE HIGHWAY 
AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE 
SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
COLLISION. 
Counsel's argument under point II completely over-
looks the reckless disregard that plaintiff exhibited for 
the safety of other persons and property upon the high-
way in his failure to drive at such a rate of speed and in 
his· failure to keep his car under such control that he 
could have brought it to a stop within the distance of his 
VISion. His argument completely overlooks the fact 
that there is competent evidence upon which the court 
found plaintiff was driving at a speed in excess of that 
fix1ed by la'v under circumstances which required extreme 
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caution, and that by reason of his own negligence found 
himself in a position from which the evidence sho,vs he 
made very little effort to extricate hin1self. Using the 
definition of proximate caus'e fixed by the court in Snook 
vs. Long 21 AL·R (1) as follows: 
"negligence is the proximate cause of an injury 
which follows such negligent act if it can fairly 
be said that in the absence of such negligence th~ 
injury or damage con1plained of would not have 
occurred"*. 
There is no doubt in the instant case but that if plaintiff 
had been driving his vehicl'e at a lawful speed, 23 miles 
per hour as testified to by the expert witness, Carter, 
if the visibility was 50 feet, and 30 miles per hour if 
the visibility was 84 feet, there would have been no 
accident and hence, no damage because at the reduced 
speed the physical facts make it amply clear, defendant 
would' ha.v'e had time to have gotten completely over on 
his side of the highway and plaintiff could have con-
tinued on unobstructed or plaintiff could have turned 
far enough to avoid the impact. In other words, plain-
tiff created his own condition of peril and did very little, 
if anything, to overcome it. With respect to counsel's 
statement on page 10, and we quote: 
"we are sure this explanation was conjured up by 
Manning as a defense measure"'"' 
it is not justified in any degree. Disregarding plaintiff's 
testilnony and defendant's testimony the physical fart~ 
bear defendant's contension out. In any event the trial 
court saw the witnesses, h'eard their testimony and it 
cannot be said that his finding in that regard i~ not 
pased upon substantial evidence. Respondenf~ ~vholP 
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argu1nent 'vith respect to traffic casualties points up 
the reason why plaintiff should have driven catefully 
and cautiously on the occasion in question. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT DID NOT 
RESULT IN A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT BEING 
EJST.A.BLISHED IN THE AUTOMOBILE LAW OF 
THIS STATE PERTAINING TO VEHICLES PASS-
ING ONE _A_XOTHER WHILE DRIVING IN AN 
OPPO·SITE DIRECTION AND THE· DECISION 
NEED XOT BE RECP~LED NOR THE CASE RE-
HEARD. 
Appellant's argument on Point III, other than its 
statement with respect to members of the bar expressing 
surprise and th:e lecture on the bottom of page 11 with 
respect to highway accidents, is nothing more than a 
reiteration of the arguments contained in its original 
brief and made before this court on the original hearing. 
We see no reason for the concern or surprise, indicated 
by members of the bar, since the original decision 
simply follows the law in this state as it has existed 
for many years. The position of appellant, if we under-
stand it correctly, is untenantable in that the provisions 
of the Statute with respect to passing other vehicles 
travelling in the same direction must of necessity be 
construed in connection with the other statutes r:egu-
lating highway traffic. In this instance, the statutes 
regulating speed, and keeping vehicles under control. 
Following appellant's argument to its logical con-
clusion, the operator of a vehicle travelling at any 
speed, regardless of how excessive, could never be 
found guilty of any negligence against the operator of 
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another vehicle lawfully and carefully passing a third 
vehicle travelling in the same direction or determing if 
safe to pass. We are not impressed that appellant's 
lecture on traffic accidents adds anythingto this case 
since it does not change the facts in the case or the law 
of the state and presents a consideration for the legis-
lature rather than this court. Added to that, as we 
understand the statistics, appellant simply makes a case 
against himself because fron1 our information, the great-
est single cause of highway casualties is excessive speed, 
the very manner in which appellant itself violated the 
statute. 
We, therefore, submit that there is nothing here to 
justify a rehearing under the decisions of this court. 
In re: McKnight 4 U t., 237, 9 P 299, Browning vs. Pick-
ard 4 Ut. 292, 9· P 573, 11 P 512, Duchen:eau vs. House 
4 Ut. 483, 11 P 618 Cummings vs. Neilson 42 Ut. 157, 129 
P 619. Many other cases could be cited. 
CONCLUSION 
The p:etition for rehearing should be dismissed: 
(1) For the reason that it was not filed or served 
within the time and manner provided by Rule 76 (e) 
(1) and 76 (e) (4) U. R. C. P. 
(2) There is nothing presented in the petition for 
rehearing which is new or showing that this court 
misconstrued the facts or erred in its application of the 
law to those facts and that all matters offered in the 
petition for rehearing and attached brief were fully 
considered and discussed and acted upon by this court. 
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